Telegram 423

London, March 9th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 423

My telegram circular D. 388 of 3rd March, paragraph 6.

United States Government have now informed us they share our opinion that it would not be desirable for Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria particularly, since the latter country is still an enemy state, to enter into a Pact of Mutual Assistance or other international agreement of a political character during the armistice period.

2. United States Government are accordingly informing Soviet and Yugoslav Governments of their views. They would, however, prefer to await an expression of Soviet Government view before discussing this question with Bulgarian authorities.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec’d 2:30 a.m., March 10th.

Telegram 437

London, March 13th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 437

My telegram circular D. 423 of March 9th.

It was hoped that M. Molotov would let us know his Government's views on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Pact at the Crimea Conference. However, as this was not possible (see my telegram Circular No 316 of February 20th), discussions will now take place between M. Molotov and United Kingdom and United States Ambassadors in Moscow.

2. United Kingdom Ambassador, Moscow, has accordingly been instructed to take part in the discussion on the lines of paragraph 2 of my telegram Circular D. 1 of January 1st and to make following two further points:

(a) We still wish to learn the Soviet Government's views on an enlarged Macedonia, and
(b) We think it is important that the Bulgarian Government should be made aware at an early date of our views on the question of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Pact. Though we would prefer a three Power communication to Bulgaria, United Kingdom Ambassador is to inform M. Molotov if he does not agree to this suggestion, or if discussions become unduly prolonged, that we shall be obliged, to make a communication on our own.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec’d 1:48 p.m.

"We have unsubstantiated reports that elements in the Bulgarian embassy here are working closely with Greek colleagues on activities that are not in our interests."

US Amb. Reeker, Skoje, RoMk, 29-Jul-2009

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http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09SKOPJE369.html

Viewing cable 09SKOPJE369,

MACEDONIA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM NATO ADVISORY TEAM

Reference ID: 09SKOPJE369
Created: 2009-07-29 07:06
Released: 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Skopje

VZCZCXRO8843
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0369 2100706
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290706Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8432
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0544
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

SKOPJE 000369

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS NATO MK BU NL
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM NATO ADVISORY TEAM
SNAFU

Classified By: Ambassador Reeker for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: The assignment of Bulgarians to both the commander and deputy positions of the NATO Advisory Team for Macedonia is not in U.S. interests. End summary.

2. (C) We learned off-line in early June that Bulgaria was the only Ally who volunteered to fill the "Chief NAT" position in Skopje, i.e., the deputy position at the NATO Advisory Team for Macedonia. As we understood it, the plan had been for the former Dutch DATT to take the Chief NAT position, but it appears that the Dutch government did not move precipitously to effect this. We then worked with Naples, USNATO, SHAPE, and the Dutch to turn this around, but it now appears that the Dutch DATT will almost certainly not be assigned, and the momentum remains that the next Chief NAT will be a Bulgarian. A Bulgarian, Commodore Valentin Gagashev, already holds the NAT Commander slot.

3. (C) The negative consequences for NATO's engagement in Macedonia could be significant. Bulgaria and Macedonia are wary neighbors at best. Part of the larger Macedonian region
became part of Bulgaria as a consequence of the Balkan Wars, and Bulgarian fascists occupied present-day Macedonia during World War II. To this day, there are elements in Bulgaria who consider the modern state of Macedonia as a historical mistake, and many Bulgarians do not recognize the Macedonian language as separate from their own. While a number of Macedonians work in Bulgaria and hold Bulgarian passports as a matter of convenience, we should not mistake this for deep affection. We have unsubstantiated reports that elements in
the Bulgarian embassy here are working closely with Greek colleagues on activities that are not in our interests.

4. (C) Regardless of the intentions of the new Chief NAT, it makes no sense from a NATO perspective that the commander and chief would come from the same country, especially a
neighbor, and especially a country so new to the Alliance.
Macedonia, and our interests here, would be far better served -- as in the past -- by a NAT leadership steeped in NATO experience from established Allies with no "negative baggage"
here (such as Greece). Macedonia needs advisors in the NAT who have established relationships within NATO and know how to manage the unique bureaucracy at SHAPE. This is why the
Dutch DATT was the ideal choice. When CHOD LTG Stojanovski learned that the new Chief NAT would be from Bulgaria, he was incensed and called SHAPE immediately. His response should have been predictable: many Macedonians do not trust Bulgaria. Thus the assignment of Bulgarians to run the NAT calls into question NATO's commitment to Macedonia, especially since a number of Macedonian military contacts had told us that they viewed the assignment of the Dutch DATT as a signal of NATO's commitment to again send its "A-team" here.

5. (C) The new NAT commander, Commodore Gagashev, is by all accounts a professional and working in good faith. While we understand he privately believes it would be a mistake for
his deputy to also be a Bulgarian, he cannot force the issue within his national command structure. While it is likely too late for the Dutch DATT to be assigned to this position, we would ask that Washington, USNATO, and Embassy Sofia work to issue to ensure a better outcome for U.S. and NATO interests in Macedonia.

REEKER

Very interesting new publication of collection of 61 documents (records), made from the Bulgarian Committee for Disclosing the Documents and Announcing Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to the State Security and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National Armed Forces (CDDAABCSSISBNAF)

It is noteworthy that today's Bulgarian unreformed ex-communist secret services work by the same plans, with the same methods and with the same peoples (agents), even!

---------
State Security – Political Police
(09.09.1944 - 10.11.1989)
Collection of Records
2011
---------
Editor in charge: Dr. Orhan ISMAILOV
Compilers’ body: Dr. Orhan ISMAILOV, Hristo HRISTOV, Momchil METODIEV
Scientific consultant: Veselin TSELKOV, Professor, D.Sc.
Technical assistants: Hyulya IBRAHIMOVA, Gyursel SALIM
---------

Source URL for downloading of the ePublication (106 MB):

http://www.comdos.bg/media/SBORNIK-05.pdf

---------

Intersting for Macedonia and Macedonian Question (but not all!!!): (by number of pages of the ePublication)

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p.172 to p.174 (1952):

"Doc.No.19.

Strictly confidential written reference about the Section of National Minorities based on an order to activate agents’ operative work in Department III, 20 August 1952
(CDDAABCSSISBPA) – M, f.13, inv.1, a.u.970, sheets 5-7)
It contains information on the Turkish and Macedonian minorities and the related main tasks in the work of the Section."

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p.269 to p.275 (1960):

"Doc.No.31.

Top Secret memorandum of crucial significance from General Georgi Krastev, Head of Division III of the State Security, to General Mircho Spassov, Deputy Minister of the Interior on: “The implementation of planned activities in the division to enhance the intelligence and counterintelligence work“, 20 October 1960
(CDDAABCSSISBPA) – M, f.13, inv.1, a.u.1672, sheets 16-22)
The document bears a higher degree of secrecy because it contains data about the attempts of Division III of the State Security to conduct intelligence activities outside the country through its agents."

p.273 (1960):

"For USA and Canada, Agent "Gosho", who is new-recruited and promising agent, and is young and have contacts with Mihajlovist circles, and is well-built environment for his bringing;"

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p.325 (1975):

Anonymous pro-Macedonian leaflets and contention of the new Bulgarian
socialistic nation!

"Doc.No.41.

Top Secret written reference on the operative situation in the country in the area of anonymous activities in the period 1974-1977, 22 November 1977 (CDDAABCSSISBPA) – M, f.22, inv.1, a.u.74, sheets 1a-5)
It is a written reference on countering the anonymous political activities in the period 1974-1977, which contains statistical data about the anonymous letters throughout the years and exposed authors of anonymous documents. The document is indicative of the attention paid to this activity by the State Security."

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p.382 to p.388 (1981):

"Doc. No.45.

Top Secret events that Division VI proposes to include in the overall plan to frustrate the attempts of certain circles abroad to falsify and usurp the historical past of Bulgaria, 16 November 1981 (CDDAABCSSISBPA) – M, f.22, inv.1, a.u.141, sheets 35-41)
The document outlines some measures against the attempts of certain circles abroad to falsify Bulgarian historical heritage. Penetration in specific foreign scientific institutes, collection of archives relating to Bulgarian history, strengthening the propaganda abroad of the Bulgarian vision of the history are proposed. The document is indicative of the attempts of the State Security to impose its views on researches not only in Bulgaria but
abroad as well."

Secret work for the Bulgarian communistic state security service (the communistic political police):

p.386 point 9.: Agents from Slavonic Committee [former name of the Bulgarian
Agency of the Bulgarians Abroad]

p.386 point 10.: Agents from Bulgarian Orthodox Church (of Maxim)

p.386 point 11.: Agents from MPO for USA and Canada ("Through our agents, to influence leaders of MPO activity to strengthen their opposition and exposing Skopje's and Greek falsification of our history. To do more to actively make use of their journals in USA and Canada."

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p.414 to p.421

"Doc.No.48.

Top Secret information from Department 02 on guaranteeing the safety of Bulgarian citizens temporarily residing abroad, 8 September 1982
(CDDAABCSSISBPA) – M, f.22, inv.1, a.u.166, sheets 1-7)
The information is from September 1982 and concerns the measures of Division VI to guarantee security for the Bulgarian citizens traveling abroad. The focus of these measures is placed on the need to “protect” those citizens from Western influence, while they are abroad. It contains a list of measures to improve “counterintelligence provision” for the Bulgarian citizens temporarily staying abroad, including by strengthening the control over issuance of permits to travel abroad."

p.418:

"The leader of the Anarchy-Movement and Secretary of the Bulgarian Section of BBC Alexander Georgiev, traitor of the fatherland from 1959, favour of the national-chauvinistic base for union of the Macedonian population of Greece, SFRJ and PRBg."

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