Royal Greek Embassy – Ottawa

July 13, 1951

Dear Mr. Reid,

With reference to our conversation of the 11th instant, I think I had better give you below the exact titles of the newspapers in question:

Makedonska Tribuna (Bulgarian)
Ellinoamericanicon Vima (Greek)

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Nicolas A. Anissas, Ambassador of Greece.

Mr. E. Reid, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa.

E. Reid/PW

July 11, 1951

Memorandum for Defense Liaison Division (2)

Macedonian Propaganda in Canada

The Greek Ambassador when he was calling on me today said that he wished to draw our attention to the importation into Canada of two newspapers which by considered were directed by the Cominform and which, in his opinion, were having harmful effects among persons in Toronto of Macedonian origin.

2. These two newspapers are: Makedonska Tribuna, published in Indianapolis; Pamericane Tribune, published in New York. The first is the Bulgarian language, the second in the Greek language.

3. According to the Ambassador, these two newspapers are not openly communistic. Openly they are in favour of Macedonian autonomy. However, in the Ambassador’s opinion, the present agitation for Macedonian autonomy reflected in these newspapers is directed by the Cominform in Bulgaria.

4. The Ambassador suggested that it would be in the interests both in Canada and of Greece if the importation of these newspapers into Canada could be prohibited. He realizes the difficulties.

5. I said I would have this matter looked into and that we would let him know.

6. I should be grateful if you would look into it.

E.R.

Royal Yugoslav Consulate General

Montreal, September 2nd, 1936

Hr. 85/36.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that a convention will be held in Toronto on Sept. 6th, 1936, for a duration of three days by the Macedonian Organization of Toronto, Ont. This political organization intends to carry a banner of the picture of Vlade Tehermazemski, assassin of the late King Alexander I of Yugoslavia.

We have been informed that the demonstration will march through the main streets of the city of Toronto with the banners which procedure is directed against our Dynasty and our country which is friendly to Canada. Such proceeding is calculated to rouse the feelings of loyal residents of the Yugoslav people in Canada and may provoke a serious breach of public peace and good order besides creating bitter feelings among Yugoslav colonies all over Canada.

Therefore, I earnestly beg your intervention to prevent such proceedings on Canadian soil as organized hero worship of murder which we feel certain has no encouragement either from your Government or from the friendly people of Canada. I may ask you to be so kind as to take the necessary steps as soon as possible because the time is very short.

Enclosed you will find the article from the Evening Telegram of Toronto.

Trusting that you will give our request your kind attention,

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (George Sigmund), Secretary

Telegram 455

September 3rd, 1940

Bulgarian Minster remarks on Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations, and politically his opinion constitutes over-simplification of a complex situation. They should not be accepted without prior critical analysis. It is true, however, that relations remain normally good though Yugoslavia's slight disappointment and anxiety over Axis lnfluene on the Bulgarian Government and Russian influcnce on Bulgarian population seems now rather paltry.

2. [?South] Macedonian, here again situation is complex. Italy is at work and perhaps Germany too with (incidentally) no friendly intentions towards Yugoslav unity.

3. The Macedonians of South Serbia as distinct from Macedonian leaders outside the country may be divided into three main groups: (1) Ideological Federalists whose spiritual leader is Mihailoff, democratic in outlook but lacking political realism. They tend to idealize Bulgarian people but for the present are generally loyal to Yugoslav State. (2) Communist Federalists, whose goal is a free Macedonia within a great South Slav Federation linked to the Soviet Union. (3) Disconsolate peasantry who resist tax collectors, without their crops, and remain in a perpetual state of discontent against the Serbs.

4. It remains to be seen whether Italian propaganda can re-awaken among the people a movement for an independent Macedonia, this desire for which at present seemed to be practically confined to Macedonian leaders. In any event it seems that the idea of an independent Macedonia under Italian influence is generally regarded as a poor second best by Macedonian leaders who, it seems, would prefer for the present that Macedonians of South Serbia should continue to belong to Yugoslavia as loyal citizens subject to grant of increased local autonomy.

5. Matter should not therefore be over easy for Italy especially if Yugoslav Government are prepared to conciliate Macedonian National sentiment. This they have not so far been prepared to do and recently appointed Ban of Vardarska Banovina is a reactionary “old Serb” with Federalist ideas which he has been putting into practice with brutal thoroughness. It appears however that the Government have been recently trying to moderate his zeal.

6. I agree that it seems hardly necessary to consider question of Macedonia at present moment in connexion with Yugoslav-Bulgaria relations.

7. I am continuing to watch developments of Macedonian situation and am trying to collect material sufficiently well-founded to justify a considered report to your Lordship.

Telegram 306

London, February 16th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 306

My telegram Circular D. 200 of February 2nd.

Yugoslav-Bulgarian Pact. We have received no independent information from Brigadier MacLean regarding negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for conclusion of a Pact of Alliance and Mutual Assistance referred to by Soviet Government.

2. Our preliminary view is that proposed Pact would be open to much same objection as a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation. Meanwhile, Brigadier MacLean has been instructed to reserve our position if Tito mentions the project.

Telegram 554

London, April 12th, 1944

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 554

Following for the Prime Minister. Begins:

The development of a Resistance Movement in Bulgaria has brought to the surface again the Macedonian question. There are a considerable number of Bulgarians fighting with Tito’s men in southern Serbia and Macedonia, and Tito’s programme includes the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia. The Bulgarian Resistance Movement proper is divided on the Macedonian question, some sections of it advocating an autonomous Macedonia and others not.

2. We are determined at all costs to avoid being involved in the Macedonian question at this stage, and our liaison officers in Bulgaria are to be instructed to make it perfectly plain that we decline to discuss the question with anyone, and that our only concern is in getting Bulgaria out of the war and freeing Greek and Yugoslav territory from Bulgarian forces.

3. The Macedonian question has been the bane of Bulgarian politics for many years. It involves all Balkan countries to a greater or lesser extent. The Greek Government from the early days of the war have been suspicious of any contact we have had with the Macedonians, and our support of Tito in southern Serbia and of the Bulgarian Resistance Movement has led to a renewal of this nervousness. An autonomous Macedonia would cut across Greek aspirations to a frontier rectification with Bulgaria in, for instance, the Struma Valley. Tito’s advocacy of an autonomous Macedonia is understandable as part of his programme of diminishing Serbian influence, since such a state could only be formed at the territorial expense of Serbia. Our support of Tito, however, does not include support of his anti-Serbian aims. Bulgarian interest in Macedonia is, of course obvious.

4. Our information regarding the present situation in Macedonia and the Macedonian movement is, however, far from complete and, since the Partisans operating in Macedonia are under Tito’s control, we are asking our liaison officers in Yugoslavia to supply us with a report on their activities. Ends.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Telegram 775

London, May 7th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 775

My telegram Circular D. 52? of 29th March.

Yugoslavia

Ambassador, Belgrade, reports that Yugoslav Government decides on April 26th to recognize Hoxha’s Administration as Government of Albania and to establish diplomatic relations with that Government and with Bulgaria.

2. Yugoslav Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed Ambassador that he would receive an official notification of this effect. Ambassador replied that while decision about Albania was comprehensive, he did not quite understand the position regarding Bulgaria as that Yugoslavia is still at war with that country. Under-Secretary explained as Bulgarian Army was fighting along side Yugoslav troops in the liberation of the country, it was natural that Yugoslav Government should wish to establish some kind of diplomatic relations with Bulgarian Government. He explained that the position of Yugoslav representatives in Sofia would be analogous to that of Sir N. Charles in Rome.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Telegram 488

London, December 12th, 1946

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 488

My telegram Circular D. 1150, 10th December.

Greece

Current discussion on alleged incursions over Greek frontier by her northern neighbours contain frequent references to Macedonian autonomous movement NOF. This organization is present day counter-part of former autonomous movement IMRO and OCHRANA; but it differs in being more closely allied with Yugoslav-Macedonian aspirations, in relation no doubt to suspected plans for Yugoslav and Bulgarian Federation after signature of Peace Treaty with later country. The following notes by United Kingdom Consul General at Salonica on NOF, may therefore be of interest, Begins.

1. During the enemy occupation of Greece, Bulgaria, not content with Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, was anxious to annex Central and Western Macedonia, and with German permission infiltrate OCHRANA agents who operated mainly in the area between Florina, Kastoria, Kozani and Edessa. Kalcheff, now serving a life sentence in Greece as a war criminal, was the chief of OCHRANA in Greece. OCHRANA’s aims were exactly the same as those of IMRO. At that time there was no collaboration between OCHRANA and EAM/ELAS. On the contrary there were frequent clashes, and ELAS disarmed OCHRANA bands wherever it could.

2. As, however, Axis power showed distinct signs of weakening another organization was indicated, this time an anti-fascist one, and about July-August 1944 SNOF (Slavomakedonski Narodni Osloboditelni Front) was founded, the members of which were the same as those of OCHRANA with a few additions. Directives now came from Moscow – though via Tito – and SNOF collaborated with EAM/ELAS until about October-November 1944 when a split occurred and Gotche (alias Gotseff) its military leader, and his men withdrew into Yugoslavia (Vardar Macedonia). It is said that this split was cause by EAM/ELAS insistence on bringing SNOF bands further south, presumably with the object of utilizing them against the Government and British in Athens, and by Gotcheff’s refusal to abandon his own are.

3. Subsequently SNOF dropped the S (Slavomakedonski), which was objectionable to a large section of KKE following, and became NOF. That this latter is merely the continuation of SNOF is admitted in a leader in “Deltion” of 20th February. “Deltion” claims to be the “official organ of NOF” and is believed to be published in Skopje. It is printed in Makedonski and Greek. In the same issue, an extract from a manifesto is published by ASNOM (Antifascist Council of People’s Liberation of Macedonia) urging “Macedonians” under Greece and Bulgaria to participate in the “gigantic antifascist front” which is the only way “to win the right of self-determination and unity of the entire Macedonian people under the aegis of Tito’s Yugoslavia”.

4. It is correct that NOF does not participate in “autonomous activities” in that it does not work for Macedonian autonomy in the true meaning of the work (which was the object of IMRO when first founded in 1891-1892), nor for autonomy and the incorporation with Bulgaria, which IMRO and OCHRANA subsequently stood for. For reasons best known to Moscow, Belgrade and Sofia, NOF now owes allegiance to Tito, and the means to ensure Macedonia passing under his “aegis” would be the union of “Vardar” (Yugoslav), “Aegean” (Greek) and “Pirin” (Bulgarian) Macedonia under the president of Vardar Macedonia at Skopje – to form a single unit of the Federal State. This is clear from another leader of “Deltion” of 15th March, where it is stated that “from the early days, the Macedonian people had expressed its will to live with the people of Yugoslavia, since the Yugoslav people esteem it (the Macedonian people) as a people, and since under Marshal Tito’s wise leadership the Macedonian people, in a common struggle with the people of Yugoslavia, won its national freedom for the first time”. In the same leader it is said that “the Macedonian people of Aegean Macedonia is right in wanting union with its supporter the leading Macedonia of Vardar”.

5. Nor is it only NOF which holds such ideas. Tito in his speech at Skopje on October 11th, 1945, as reported in the “Deltion” of 21st October, spoke of the unity of all Macedonians within Federal Yugoslavia and rebuked Bulgarian “reactionaries” who still spoke of “Greater Macedonia” i.e. “independent” Macedonia. Ends.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Telegram 316

London, February 20th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 316

My telegram Circular D. 306 of 16th February

Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations

Proposed Yugoslav-Bulgarian Pact was discussed at Crimea Conference, but no final agreement was reached. In discussion Mr. Eden maintained that proposed Pact raised serious issues of principle as Bulgaria was an ex-enemy State whose affairs were regulated by Armistice regime. In our view Bulgaria was debarred from entering into such treaties without permission from the Armistice Powers concerned. Mr. Eden suggested that it should be made clear to the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments by the Three Powers that they should not proceed with proposed Pact. M. Molotov said he thought that the Three Powers should limit themselves for the present to an exchange of views, but promised to consider the whole matter further. No further progress was made at the Conference.

2. Brigadier MacLean has now been instructed to take an early opportunity to let Tito know our views, and we are informing Soviet Government that if there were any public allusion to a proposal for such a Pact we, likewise, would be obliged to make public our own views.

3. We are informing United States State Department and expressing hope that they will adopt attitude similar to our own.

Telegram 365

London, February 27th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 365

My telegram circular D. 316.

February 20th, paragraph 2, Yugoslav-Bulgar1an relations.

Brigadier MacLean has spoken to M. Tito according to his instructions.

2. During this conversation M. Tito said that the proposed Yugoslav-Bulgarian Agreement was one of trade and friendship which would in no way prejudice Greek interests. To Brigadier MacLean’s suggestion that the signature of such a Pact would cause a deplorable impression, M. Tito replied that signature was not in fact imminent. Tito said he was always telling the Bulgarians not to expect their neighbours to forget their past atrocious conduct in a few months, but on the other hand he had no wish to perpetuate the traditional enmity or two countries.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec’d 4:54 a.m. Feb. 28th.

Telegram

June 6, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 999

My telegram circular D. 437 of March 13th.



Greek Government have expressed to us and to United States Government concern over efforts now being made to promote a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation. Greek Government say that this would be tantamount to a Slavic hegemony over Balkans threatening Salonica and eastern and western Thrace; that having in mind this possible menace they feel justified in asking for a strategic rectification of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier by cession of Bulgarian territory; and that only such conditions as would give Greek people a sense of security will permit them to view without apprehension a possible future Balkan Federation.

2. Greek Government asked us to warn Yugoslav Government against any claims or designs prejudicial to territorial integrity of Greece in Macedonia or to Greek claims in northern Epirus.

3. In reply, we are informing Greek Government of warning given to Yugoslav and Bulgarian Governments last January against formation of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation or creation of a greater Macedonian State involving claims on Greek territory (my telegram Circular D. 182). We do not propose to inform them of warning (my telegram Circular D. 365) given to Tito against conclusion of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty (in favour of which Soviet Government had expressed themselves - see my telegram Circular D. 200)

4. We doubt whether Greek territorial claims against Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania are justified and are confining ourselves to informing Greek Government that we can enter into no commitments at this stage.

5. State Department, who enquired our views, have been informed of our reply.

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Rec’d. 9:55 P.M.

Telegram

London, January 1, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 1

My telegram circular D. 1835 of December 20th.

Yugoslavia

There have recently been various signs that the idea of Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation is favourably entertained in the Yugoslav National Liberation movement and that the Bulgarians are preparing to foster agitation for a Greater Macedonia at the expense of Greece. As regards Macedonia, Tito has given personal assurance that he had no aggressive intentions against Macedonia and that any Yugoslav claims would be raised in an ordinary fashion at the Peace Conference and not before. (See my telegram Circular D. 1796 of December 12th, paragraph 3).

2. Our view on the general question is that we should welcome a Federation between all the Balkan states, both Allied and enemy, and including possibly Turkey. We would not, however, approve an exclusive Union or Federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria which would not only be unlikely to promote a Federation between all the Balkan states but would also isolate Greece and so endanger her position as a Balkan state. It would also enable Bulgaria, who has in both world wars joined Germany against her neighbours and against the Western Democratic Powers, to escape from the consequences of her acts by merging her identity in that of one of the United Nations. As regards Macedonia, we are prepared to acquiesce in the creation of a Macedonian State as a Federal unit in the future Federal Yugoslavia. But we must insist that this state (or the Yugoslav Government speaking on its behalf) shall not annex nor lay claims to any territories whatsoever belonging to either Bulgaria or Greece, on the ground that such territories are “Macedonian”.

3. We are informing the United States and Soviet Governments of our views as above.

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Telegram 388

London, March 3rd, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 388

Yugoslavia

In response to statement of our views on question of Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation and a Greater Macedonia contained in my telegram Circular D. 1of January 1st , United States Government have now replied as follows.

2. United States Government hold view that prewar frontiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece in Macedonian area must be considered legal boundaries and that any revision should only be allowed in accordance with freely expressed wish or populations concerned and as part or a general peace settlement.

3. United States Government would not object if, in reconstitution or Yugoslavia, Government and people of that country wished to set up a regional and de-centralized administration under which south eastern Yugoslavia would have a certain autonomous character. They, however, share our view that there is no legitimate basis for any claim made on behalf of “Macedonia”, whether as an independent State or as a part of Yugoslavia or of a larger South Slav Federation, to territory within the boundaries of Greece on the ground that such territory is “Macedonian”.

4. While the United States Government favour the retention or the present frontier between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, they would not object to any settlement beneficial to the general welfare of the region provided it represented the real wishes of the people concerned, including those Yugoslavs still in enemy occupied territory.

Telegram

London, March 26th, 1949

Circular H. 75. Saving. My telegram 23rd February Circular H. 50. Saving

Greece and the Yugoslav – Cominform Dispute – Position during the War

1. During the German occupation of Greece it was policy of the Communist Party of Greece (K.K.E.) to make use of the National resistance movement in order to seize power and establish a Communist state. With this end in view, the Communists formed a resistance organization known as the National Resistance Front (E.A.M.), which was on the surface a non-political union of different resistance groups, but was in practice completely dominated by K.K.E. E.A.M. made it its business to suppress all rival resistance groups, if necessary by force, and by the end of 1944 it was left alone in the field.

2. Meanwhile the resistance movement in Yugoslavia was known by the similar name of O.F. (Liberation Front) or N.O.F. (National Liberation Front). Its counter part among the Slav-Macedonians of Northern Greece was S.N.O.F. (Slavo-Macedonian National Liberation Front) or, later, simply N.O.F., which remained under E.A.M. control until September 1944, when the leader of the Slav-Macedonian Units, Gotseff (Elias Dimakis) broke with E.A.M. and lead his men to Skopje (Yugoslavia) where a federal republic of Macedonia had been set up within the Yugoslav federation. (After January 1946, N.O.F. activity, directed from Yugoslavia reappeared in Northern Greece working in conjunction with the increasing rebel activities of K.K.E.).

3. During the occupation the aim of the N.O.F. and K.K.E. were in one respect identical that is to say that both were more interested in achieving power after the war than in actually driving out the Germans. Apart from this, however, their aim was inherently contradictory: whereas K.K.E. sought to establish a new regime with authority throughout the whole of Greece, N.O.F. were bent on setting up a new People’s Republic of Macedonia to be formed by the union of the Pirin (Bulgarian), Vardar (Yugoslav) and Aegean (Greek) areas of Macedonia. So long as Soviet Russia was primarily interested in winning the war, she was able to play down these differences and even a certain amount of co-operation was witnessed between the two parties. At the conclusion of the war, the only chance in the situation was only that the policy dictated by Moscow became that of a destroying the established Greek Government at all costs preparatory to the setting up of some sort of Communist-Controlled regime. The precise form which that regime would take was not specified and Moscow was thus still able to keep well in the background the conflict of interest between N’O’F’ and K.K.E.

Developments following from the Yugoslav-Cominform dispute

4. On the outbreak of the Yugoslav-Cominform dispute, the Russians seem to have realized:

(a) That they could no longer hope to control the Yugoslav-dominated N.O.F., and
(b) that, so long as Greece’s northern neighbours were divided amongst themselves, plans for destroying her government must be for the moment put aside.

They therefore re-shaped their policy, and it now seems that their main objective is to set up a People's Republic of Macedonia, under Bulgarian influence. In this way, they would hope to divert the autonomous aspirations of the Slavo-Macedonians in Greece from the Yugoslav to the traditional Bulgarian channel. As a long tem objective the Russians probably had in mind the value of a land bridge to Albania, at present very hard hit by the isolated position in which her anti-Titoism has placed her. (My telegram Circular H. 3l Saving).

5. This change of policy has had two visible results. The first was the purge of K.K.E. (my telegram under reference); this purge was presumably designed to remove from office any nationalist deviationists who might have objected to a policy involving the sacrifice of Greek territory. The second was the setting up of a rival N.O.F. under Bulgarian influence based on Aegean Macedonia. The activities of this body are reported in my immediately following telegram.

SECRETARY OF ST'ATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

Telegram

London, January 8, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 33

My telegram circular D. 1 of January 1st.

Yugoslavia

Head of British Military Mission in Belgrade reports that second session of Anti-Fascist Council for National Liberation of Macedonia (A.S.N.O.M.) opened at Skopje on December 28th.

2. Session was attended by Kardelj, Tito’s political right hand man, Vlanov, Vice-President of Avnoj, and General Tempo. General Eresen is also reported to have been present representing the Bulgarian Government, and representatives of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front and Macedonians from Pirin as well as representatives of the British, American and Soviet Missions were also present.

3. Speaking as Tito’s representative, Kardelj congratulated Macedonians on their newly won autonomy, but warned them that they still have to achieve victory in the political field as well as on the field of battle. For Macedonia, Kardelj emphasized the future could only be within the framework of the new Federal Democratic Yugoslavia.

4. Apart from a veiled reference to the present position in Greece, his speech seemed unobjectionable. It confirmed that the new Macedonia will remain part of Yugoslavia and made no reference to a possible wider Southern Slav Federation. Nor did Kardelj make any territorial claims on behalf of Macedonia outside the present frontier of Yugoslavia.

5. Brigadier Maclean believes that Kardelj was sent to Skopje by Tito in order to ensure adherence to the party lines, which in this case seems to have been one of moderation and discretion.

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Telegram

London, January 16, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 84

My telegram circular D. 1 of January 1st.

Yugoslavia

Tito, who has not yet being notified of our views on the idea of Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation, has expressed himself in conversation with Brigadier Maclean as opposed to Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation at the present time. He went on to say that, although he did not exclude the possibility of an eventual extension of Yugoslav Federation at some period in the future, there was no question of either Bulgaria or Albania entering into any Federal Union with Yugoslavia at present.

In case of Bulgaria in particular, Tito was not ready for such a step. As he had pointed out to a Bulgarian delegation, which had visited him the day before with polite messages, the Bulgarians had on several occasions in the past, sworn eternal friendship to the Serbs but this had not prevented them from turning on them and massacring them at first opportunity. It would take the Serbs some time to forget the behaviour of Bulgaria in three wars. At the same time, there was no point in perpetuating such enmity and, if good relations could be achieved, it would be to everyone’s advantage.

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Telegram 158

London, January 26th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 158

My telegram circular D. 84.

Bulgaria

British Political Representative at Sofia reports that according to reliable sources the Bulgarian Prime Minister has been “indisposed” for the last few days and Lieutenant General Terpeshev (see my telegram Circular D. 33 of January 8th, paragraph 2) has been presiding over the Council of Ministers in his absence. M. Georgiev is, in fact, believed to have left Sofia in the company of Soviet officers for the purpose of discussing with Marshal Tito, or his representatives, the establishment of a South Slav Confederation. He is expected, according to the source, to return to Sofia shortly when some declaration on the subject will be made.

2. Source also stated that on March 3rd (anniversary of Bulgarian liberation and of accession of King Boris III) Bulgaria would be proclaimed a Republic. This development would be followed a few weeks later by the cession to an autonomous Macedonian State of the Pirin are of Bulgaria. Source, however, thought that local inhabitants of that district might resist.

3. Finally, source said that Soviet authorities were understood to have indicated that any claim which might be advanced by the new South Slav Confederation to Salonica would enjoy their support.

4. Mr. Houstoun-Boswall comments that this report should not be made before the general settlement with Bulgaria as an enemy state.

5. United States Government do not favour the union of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as a single unit, since the neighbouring non-Slav States, including Turkey, would consider it a threat to their security. They would, however, consider a plan for a regional understanding to include all south eastern European States rather than an exclusive Slav block, provided these States decide, with the concurrence of the principal Allied Governments, that it would be to the general benefit of that area.

6. United States Government have not yet made known their views on the proposed Yugoslav-Bulgarian Pact of Mutual Assistance (see my telegram Circular D. 316 of February 20th)

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec’d 7:22 p.m.

Telegram 200

London, January 2, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 200

My telegram circular D. 1 of January 1st.

United Kingdom Charge d’Affairs, Moscow, conveyed our views on subject of Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation as instructed. In reply, Soviet Government have stated that they are aware that negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for conclusion of a Pact of Alliance and Mutual Assistance are proceeding, and that their attitude towards this is favourable. They consider, however, that question of a Balkan Federation and in particular of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation is “not at present actual and is of no practical importance”.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Telegram 159

London, January 26th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 159

My telegram circular D. 84.

Yugoslavia

Brigadier MacLean reports that in a moment of indiscretion recently Dr. Smodlaka, Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Yugoslav National Committee of Liberation, confirmed that Bulgarian Government had definitely, agreed to cede Bulgarian Macedonia to Yugoslavia. Furthermore, article in “Politika” (one of Tito’s newspapers) on January 14th by Commissar for Public Works in National Committee referred to Bulgaria’s to cede territory to Yugoslavia as evinced by statement of “official representative of Bulgaria” at last session of Asnom (see my telegram Circular D. 33 of January 8th) that “Bulgaria is prepared to cede her part of Macedonia” to Yugoslavia. However, official reports of Asnom meeting omitted any reference to such a statement. Mention of it in above article may be in nature of an indiscretion.

2. British Political Representative in Sofia drew attention to Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to this article and reminded him that a member of Bulgarian Government, the Lieutenant General Terpeshev, had attended the meeting. Minister for Foreign Affairs said Terpeshev was not there officially as a Cabinet Minister but as representative of Bulgarian Workers (Communist) Party. Minister for Foreign Affairs added that id people of Pirin are wanted to join their brother Macedonians in might be difficult to stop them, but time was not yet ripe for this sort of thing.

3. Mr. Houstoun-Boawall considers that present spate of pro-Yugoslav propaganda and organization of relief for Yugoslav population may represent Bulgaria’s effort to remove Yugoslav mistrust (see my telegram Circular D. 84 of January 16th). He comments that, whatever the outcome, this ostentatious demarche can hardly fail to go to Bulgaria’s credit.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec’d 2:03 a.m., January 27th.

Telegram 182

London, January 31st, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 182

My telegram circular D. 159 of January 26th.

Macedonia

In light of the information regarding Bulgarian Government readiness to cede Bulgarian Macedonia to Yugoslavia, contained in my telegram under reference, we instructed Brigadier MacLean to speak to Tito and convey to him our views on questions of Macedonia and Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation as set out in my telegram Circular D. 1 of January 1st. At the same time, Brigadier MacLean was to inform Tito that we have noted with satisfaction the assurance he has already given (see my telegram Circular D. 1796 of December 12th, paragraph 3). That he has no aggressive intention against Macedonia and that any Yugoslav claims will be raised in an orderly fashion at the Peace Conference.

2. Brigadier MacLean spoke to Tito as instructed on January 26th. Tito reported that he was convinced that this was not the time to try to establish a federation with Bulgaria or any other neighbours of Yugoslavia and that he had no intention of attempting to do so in present circumstances. He also indicated once again that he had no intention of trying to annex territory from Greece or Bulgaria before the Peace Conference when he would put forward any claim he might have in the proper way.

3. Acting on instructions, British Political Representative at Sofia has also informed Bulgarian Government of our views as follows;

While we should welcome a confederation between all Balkan States both Allied and enemy, and including possibly Turkey, we could not approve an exclusive union or federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Moreover, while we are prepared to agree to the creation of a Macedonian State in the future Federal Yugoslavia, we should be strongly opposed to the creation of a greater Macedonian State involving claims on Greek territory. We, therefore, look with disfavour on the activities of Macedonian propagandists in Bulgaria which the Bulgarian Government appear to have condoned and we do not recognize the rights of the Bulgarian Government to transfer, without the consent of the United Nations, any part of Bulgarian territory to the Yugoslav Federal State of Macedonia.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec’d 2:30 p.m.

Telegram 217

London, February 5th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 217

My telegram circular D. 33 of January 5th.

Macedonia

Brigadier MacLean reports that on January 30th General Tempo spoke in Belgrade on the Partisan Movement in Macedonia. He admitted that certain ill feelings still existed there between Macedonians and Serbs. This was legacy of the former policy of Serb centralism. (Recent reports received by Brigadier MacLean’s Mission in Macedonia confirm friction between Macedonians and Serbs).

2. Tempo implied that a united Yugoslav, Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia was the ultimate natural culmination of the legitimate aspirations of the Macedonian people, but condemned Bulgarian irredentists who were trying to ensure that Yugoslavia should not command the areas lost by Bulgaria.

3. General Tempo stated that Greek Macedonians who had joined forces with EAM/ELAS and taken part in the Greek Liberation Movement had done so on four conditions;

(a) Retention of Macedonian fighting units within ELAS.
(b) Retention of their own political organization.
(c) Administration by Macedonians of territory liberated by themselves.
(d) Ultimate right of self-determination including the right to secede, from or join any State of their own choice.

Tempo asserted that EAM and ELAS had not respected those conditions and so Greek Macedonian forces decided to cross into Yugoslav territory.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS