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Recovering Macedonia
Expiration of the Bucharest Treaty of 1913
Part 15 - The Macedonian Revival V
December, 2006
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[Macedonia will remain occupied as long as the Macedonian people
are unrecognized, abused and made to feel like strangers on their
own native lands. It is a well known fact that Macedonia was
invaded, occupied and illegally partitioned by Greece, Serbia
and Bulgaria
in 1912-1913 against the wishes of the Macedonian people. The
Serbian occupied part, now known as the Republic of Macedonia
gained its independence in 1991 and is today a sovereign state
while the parts annexed by Greece and Bulgaria remain occupied.]
A turn for the worse for the Macedonian people came in April
1897 with the Goluchowski-Muraviev Agreement drawn up by Tsar
Nikolas II of Russia and Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria. In
part, the agreement called for Macedonian territory to be divided
equally between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria at some future
time.
To take advantage of this, a year later the Bulgarian Exarchate,
instructed by the Bulgarian Prime Minister, created a Vrhovist
(supremacist) organization and based it in Solun. Known as
the "Revolutionary Brotherhood", it in turn began
to form its own insurgent groups while all along pretending
to be part of IMRO. Its purpose was to carry out terrorist
activities and blame them on the real IMRO. The Bulgarian intention
was to provoke a fight between IMRO and the Turkish militia
with hopes that IMRO would be destroyed and the Turks would
be weakened enough for Bulgaria to invade and permanently occupy
Macedonia.
Brigand activities were not exclusive to the Bulgarians, the
Greeks too through the Patriarchate Church employed brigands
to harass and exact terror on villagers. Their aim was to forcefully
Hellenize as many Macedonians as possible to show the world
that "Greeks" indeed lived in Macedonia.
The Macedonian freedom fighters or Cheti were undermanned
and poorly armed. They were fierce fighters and fought gallantly
when it came to protecting their villages but were not prepared
for an all out full scale war with the Turks.
The Turkish militia at the time had orders to conduct searches
to collect weapons but it did not always operate under the
best of ethics. Turkish soldiers discovered that they could
make a lot more money by being paid not to punish the individual
owning the weapon than to actually punish them. It became common
practice to accept bribes. People who could afford to pay bribes
were excluded from severe punishments. It was less of a punishment
to produce a rifle than it was not to have one at all.
On January 31st, 1903 the Turks declared IMRO illegal and
sought ways to destroy it. This created a controversy among
the IMRO leadership where one group wanted to take immediate
action and another felt they were not ready. The controversy
gave the Vrhovists a chance to become a wedge between those
in IMRO who wanted an immediate uprising and those who believed
that an uprising at this point was suicidal. Gotse Delchev
did not want an immediate uprising and was hoping to find a
better solution. Unfortunately during a second Congress, mostly
dominated by Vrhovists, held in Solun in February 1903 a decision
was made to start the uprising early. August 2nd, 1903 was
picked as the date to commence the rebellion. Delchev and most
of IMRO's loyal supporters feeling it was going to be a disaster
boycotted the congress.
To weaken the Turks, the Vrhovists staged a number of bombings
and terrorist acts. The Solun to Tsari Grad railway was bombed
on March 18th, as was the Solun Ottoman bank a month later.
This however, did not weaken the Turks as expected but instead
brought more Turkish troops into Macedonia and further escalated
the violence against innocent civilians. The sudden rise in
violence against Ottoman institutions was not well received
by European investors and businessmen, who saw Ottoman Macedonia
as a safe place to invest. The few lonely voices in London,
who were supporting the Macedonian cause, were quickly drowned
out by the many voices of discontent calling for the demise
of the Macedonian freedom fighters now labeled terrorists.
A general staff was elected with Damjan Gruev as the head
and preparations for the uprising began. In due time plans
were made to begin organizing the uprising. The Cheti were
armed with the few weapons available and began their training.
On July 26th, 1903, by a dispatch to the Great Powers via the
British vice-consul in Bitola, the General Staff formally announced
the uprising. Then on July 28th, 1903 IMRO dispatched mounted
couriers to all the sub-districts with the message "let
the uprising begin". On the same day the General Staff
also informed the Ottoman Director of Railways to warn travelers
to choose a safer mode of transportation in order to avoid
being hurt.
Despite the odds, the brave people of Macedonia heroically
rose to the task with valour. They knew well enough that the
fight they were about to undertake might not bring them what
they desired yet they chose to fight anyway because it was
a fight for freedom and freedom after centuries of slavery
was valued above life itself. Unfortunately, that did not convince
the Great Powers to lend a helping hand.
When the rebellion began, as a precaution, most villages were
evacuated. People who left the villages took up residence in
secluded places in the mountains. They took whatever they could
carry and set up camp in temporary shelters constructed from
tree branches and covered with vegetation. Livestock was fenced
out of sight in wooded areas and ovens to cook food and bread
were constructed underground.
Turkish soldiers had orders to burn down all empty villages,
believing them to belong to families of insurgents, and spare
the rest. In practice however, that's not how it turned out.
Villagers that didn't join the rebellion felt it was unnecessary
to evacuate because they posed no threat to the Turks. Unfortunately
the Turkish militia did not see it that way. Feeling the rebel
sting, angry militiamen turned against all civilians and when
they were done with them, they burned their homes down. Neokazi
near Lerin was one such village where 60 Macedonian men were
captured and placed under arrest. On their way to Lerin the
Turks tortured and massacred the men in cold blood. Eyewitnesses
reported seeing the Turks lining up the men in rows and firing
their newly acquired rifles at them to see how many one bullet
could kill.
Three days later it was Armensko's turn. After losing a skirmish
to Chakalarov, Haireddin Bimbishi's (the butcher of Smrdesh)
troops, defeated, angry and embittered were heading for Lerin
when they came across a welcoming committee at Armensko. The
priest and villagers went out to greet and welcome the Turks
in a peaceful manner but instead became their victims. Bambishi's
men turned on the defenseless village; pillaging, burning and
satisfying their brutal lust.
As battles raged on throughout western Macedonia, the Cheti
put down most of the local Turkish garrisons. They destroyed
bridges, railway lines and communications centers, captured
most chifliks and briefly liberated regions such as Kichevo,
Demir-Hisar, Kostur, Lerin, Klisoura and Neveska. The cities
of Kostur and Lerin themselves were not liberated. The most
successful and highly celebrated of all battles was the storming
of the town of Krushevo. Nikola Karev led the Cheti in the
attack and defeated the local Turkish garrison with ease. The
Macedonians quickly took over strategic points like the Post
Office, Town Hall and local Police Station and declared Krushevo
liberated. True to their democratic commitments, the leaders
of the liberating force constituted the Krushevo assembly which
appointed a committee of sixty members, twenty from each of
the community's Macedonian, Vlach and Albanian populations.
The committee in turn elected an executive body of six delegates,
two from each community, which operated as a provisional government.
The government in turn established a financial, judiciary and
police force. "At Krushevo, under the rays of temporary
liberty, fraternity and equality, national hatreds were dispelled
and peace and concord reigned. For eleven whole days Krushevo
lived as a little independent state, and although in miniature,
clothed with flesh and blood that idea which spurred Macedonians
to fight, against tyranny up to the Ilinden rising." (Page
193, Vasil Bogov, Macedonian Revelation, Historical Documents
Rock and Shatter Modern Political Ideology)
The "Krushevo Republic", unfortunately, only lasted
two weeks but it was a glorious Republic that will forever
remind the Macedonian people of their eternal struggle for
independence and thirst for freedom. The liberation of Krushevo
imprinted on the new Macedonian generations the legacy of a
timeless and irreversible march towards self-determination.
Here again we see the Macedonian desire for multiculturalism
and for a new multiethnic society waiting to resurface. The
Republic was constituted on a multiracial basis in accordance
with the wishes of the majority of the Macedonian people.
Next to Krushevo, Kostur faired second best in the tactical
mobilization of the Cheti, under the command of Lazar Pop Trajkov
and Vasil Chakalarov. These brigades staged successful raids,
liberating Klisura and Neveska, then returned southward and,
with the support of over three thousand villagers, attacked
Kostur but without success. In the meantime other Cheti attacked
and liberated Ohrid, which remained free for almost three months.
The Ohrid attack was the most successful in terms of advance
planning and administering the establishment of medical aid,
underground workshops, secret bakeries and securing foodstuffs.
Ohrid later became the center for establishing refugee camps
for many displaced persons.
Uprisings outside of western Macedonia were limited to swift
guerilla actions consisting mostly of attacks against Ottoman
institutions, bombings of railway lines and the occasional
skirmish with the Turkish militia. Many Cheti were successful
in capturing important Turkish officials. They hoped to construct
dialogue for prospective negotiations but, in actuality, met
with little success.
Vrhovist involvement, as expected, was minimal during the
uprising and brought to light, once again, the true nature
of Vrhovism (Macedonia for the Bulgarians). As the Cheti fought
gallantly putting down garrison after garrison in the larger
towns, many of the smaller villages were left unprotected and
open to Bashi-bazouk (armed Muslim civilians) and Turkish militia
attacks. Keeping in mind the Neokrazi and Armensko incidents,
many of the Cheta chiefs felt compelled to return home to repel
such attacks. Due to this and the fact that the numerically
superior Turkish militia overpowered the Cheti, in the short
term, a large-scale operation against the Turks never materialized.
Unfortunately, as time passed so did the opportunity for a
decisive strike, as an even larger Turkish force was amassing.
The initial success of the rebellion was a surprise to the
Turks especially since Turkish forces were numerically superior.
The Cheti demonstrated their abilities in battle and more than
matched the numbers with will. Turkey, unfortunately, was determined
to put down the rebellion and amassed additional forces, deploying
a total of 167,000 infantry, 3,700 cavalry and 440 pieces of
artillery (all cannons). Krushevo alone was surrounded by 20,000
Turkish troops with 18 cannons against an encircled force of
no more than 1,200 rebels. The battle to retake Krushevo began
on August 12th with the Macedonians crying out "Sloboda
ili Smirt" (liberty or death) against the onslaught of
Turkish cannon fire. Pitu Guli and his men fought gallantly
by providing stiff opposition to the Turkish advance but were
no match for General Baktiar Pasha's forces. Baktiar was a
skilled war veteran who overwhelmed the Cheti by attacking
the entire region simultaneously. The region was surrounded
by soldiers, encircled by cannon fire and every Macedonian
stronghold within was simultaneously attacked, cutting off
all reinforcements.
After the mountains lit up with gunfire and smoke filled the
skies, no Great Powers came to the rescue. Macedonians were
left alone to feel the full brunt of the Ottoman Empire's army
and to pay for all of Europe's sins committed against the Turks.
Once Krushevo fell, one by one other IMRO strongholds began
to yield, winding down the ten-week-old rebellion. In Krushevo,
Baktiar Pasha allowed his troops to kill, pillage and rape
for three days. The town was permanently devastated with 117
civilians murdered, 150 women raped and 159 houses burned.
In the Ilinden aftermath, according to Michael Radin, in total
4,694 civilians were murdered, 3,122 women raped, 12,440 houses
burned, 201 villages razed, 75,835 people left homeless and
about 30,000 people left the country for good, becoming permanent
refugees. (Page 105, IMRO and the Macedonian Question) Besides
the atrocities committed against the civilian population in
Macedonia, the most significant impact of the uprising was
the loss of so many great IMRO leaders.
Despite the negative attitudes of the European Governments,
there was much press about the Ilinden rebellion. World opinion
was generally sympathetic to the Macedonian cause and highly
critical of the Ottoman atrocities. Emigrant Macedonians the
world over bombarded the Western Press with scathing attacks
on the British, French and Austrian governments for supporting
Turkey, militarily and financially. Even emigrants as far as
the United States staged large rallies in support of the rebellion.
In New York alone more than 100,000 gathered to show support.
A Chicago newspaper reported that a Macedonian regiment had
formed in that city and was preparing to take part in the rebellion.
Closer to home, south Slav Nations such as Slovenia and Vojvodina
held public meetings in support of the Macedonian Revolution.
Even the European press featured sympathetic headlines when
covering the rebellion. "It was a bitter struggle between
the tortured slaves fighting en masse, often without weapons,
but on spirit alone, for life and liberty; and the sadistic
Pasha and his cohorts, murdering and plundering with rabidity." (Giorgio
Nurigiani) British official policy, however, was less than
sympathetic. According to the Daily News September 14, 1903,
Prime Minister Balfour told the House of Commons, "...the
balance of criminality lies not with the Turks, but with the
rebels." The paper was critical of this attitude and recorded
the following editorial: "The balance of criminality is
surely here in our own land. Britain had denied Macedonia freedom
at Berlin, knowing that (continued) Ottoman rule was synonymous
with cruelty and tyranny, and by adopting a laissez-faire attitude
at the juncture, Britain is a consenting party to all the ghastly
murders and massacres in Macedonia..." (Page 107, Radin,
IMRO and the Macedonian Question)
While there was public outcry in the streets regarding the
treatment of Macedonians, the British Government cared less
about Macedonia's suffering than about Bulgarian threats to
their precious Ottoman Empire. Being weakened by the Macedonian
rebellion, the thinking in London was that Turkey was now ripe
for a Bulgarian invasion. Balfour used the Macedonian rebellion
as a pretext to move Britain's Mediterranean Fleet into the
Aegean Sea fearing that war between Bulgaria and Turkey was
now inevitable.
At about the same time Greek-Turkish relations began to warm
up. The souring relationship between Turkey and Bulgaria was
seen as a new opportunity by Greece to accelerate her Hellenization
activities inside Macedonia. Making her way to Turkey, Greece
had to first prop up her cool relationship with Germany. Her
first attempt was initiated by inviting German help to re-organize
the Greek military. After that Greece began to grant industrial
and commercial favours to German businessmen, including the
re-organization of the Greek telegraph.
The Turks, on the other hand, were looking for allies. The
loss of Ottoman Crete to the Greeks was only a bruise to the
Turkish ego, so the Turks were willing to forgive and forget.
Losing Macedonia, however, was serious and bolstering its friendship
with Greece was one way of staving off Bulgarian advances.
To preserve whatever they could from a failing rebellion,
IMRO turned its attention to diplomacy. In September 1903 Pere
Toshev, of IMRO, took a trip to Tsari Grad to elicit some guarantees
from official representatives of the Great Powers. Toshev's
only request was that Macedonia be given a Christian governor.
Unfortunately, his request was rejected in favour of the status
quo. Later, however, when statistics of Turkish atrocities
started pouring in, the Great Power attitude softened a little.
In October the Great Powers reconsidered Toshev's request,
but instead of appointing a Christian governor each nation
agreed to send a small "peace-keeping" force. This
did not help the Macedonian position at all. In fact it hindered
IMRO from self-defense initiatives even against bandit attacks.
Turkish atrocities committed against the Macedonian villages,
in the eyes of the world, created bad publicity for Turkey
and for its allies, the Western Powers. As a result, Turkish
popularity started to decline and so did Turkey's favour with
the Great Powers. Being financially strapped and having her
hands tied, Turkey turned to her neighbours for assistance.
By declaring Macedonia a "multi-interest zone" and
inviting armed propaganda from Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia,
to counter IMRO insurgence, Turkey was hoping to turn the tide
of the rebellion in her favour. Again Great Power inaction
put Macedonia and the Macedonian people in peril.
According to Brailsford, the Cheti fought about 150 battles
in total with 746 casualties, which amounted to about 15 %
of the total fighting force. In most of these encounters the
Cheti were outnumbered by at least 10 Turks to 1 Macedonian.
(Page 155, Macedonia its Races and their Future) Before it
was all over, the Turks were attacking everywhere, even in
secluded areas that once were beyond militia reach. To save
themselves, many civilians resorted to camping among the fighters
and even following them in wild battles. Their only safety
was to be with the Cheti. "...Sometimes the battle raged
about the lair where the women and children lay, the men fighting
with all their manhood to defend some shallow trench, knowing
that behind them cowered wife and child expecting massacre
if their courage failed or their bullets missed the mark." (Page
162, Brailsford, Macedonia its Races and their Future)
IMRO leaders, who survived the rebellion, responded decisively
to the new crisis by establishing temporary centers where urgently
needed food and medical supplies were distributed to the displaced
population. While doing that they were also fighting a political
battle with the Vrhovists for control of IMRO itself. The Bulgarians
had dispatched Komitadjis (assassins) to eliminate the "old
guard" but the legendary Yane Sandanski and his Cheta
remained active and fought back fearlessly. When word got out
that Sandanski was still alive and active, he gained a large
following and was able to successfully repel all assassination
attempts.
The Ilinden rebellion had no happy ending for Macedonia. The
Macedonian people lost their bid for freedom and paid the ultimate
price of being again enslaved, in spite of their efforts. The
Macedonian rebellion did not succeed because there were too
many factors working against it. The Macedonian people showed
will and determination and rose to the task in spite of all
odds. Compared to the Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian rebellions,
the Macedonians were the most determined, well organized and
most desperate, but they were not ready. The Serbians, Greeks
and Bulgarians had only one enemy, the Turks, but received
a lot of help from friends in high places (the Great Powers).
In contrast, no one beyond the Macedonians themselves wanted
the Macedonians to succeed. The Greeks and especially the Bulgarians
went out of their way to create obstacles. The Great Powers,
believing that they had nothing to gain, also abstained from
helping Macedonia. The Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian struggles
for independence prepared the Turks and made them more determined
to deal with the Macedonians.
When the conflict was over, the people who returned to their
villages were devastated to find their homes destroyed. Added
to all their ills, winter was fast approaching and no food
or shelter was to be found. To make matters worse, a curfew
was placed on travel and those away from home found themselves
stranded. Those in need of work were no longer allowed to leave
their vilayets. This was the first time in Macedonian history
that Macedonians ever considered permanent emigration. Many
early Macedonian emigrants to Canada, the USA and Australia
were refugees from the Ilinden aftermath.
When reports of the uprising could no longer be contained
and filtered out to the foreign media, it became clear that
the Turks were not as successful as they had claimed, in keeping
peace and maintaining the status quo in Macedonia. The Great
Powers, Britain in particular, were disturbed by the atrocities
committed by Turkish soldiers. On Britain's insistence the
Great Powers recommended European officers take over command
of the Turkish gendarmerie. Unfortunately, the European officers
were Christians and the Turks refused to take orders from them.
The German officers had some success because they had trained
the Turks but not enough to make a difference. To prevent the
situation from deteriorating further, Britain pushed for high-level
reforms which resulted in the appointment of two Turkish inspectors
but in the end they did nothing to ease the problems.
As mentioned earlier, determined to eradicate IMRO influence,
Turkey turned to her neighbours for help. By declaring Macedonia
a "multi-interest-zone" Turkey invited armed propaganda
from Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia to counter the insurgents.
The failed uprising, loss of so many great IMRO leaders, the
Turkish backlash and now the foreign influence was too much
for IMRO. The close links with the villages and the ideological
differences between isolated IMRO branches widened. Although
IMRO continued to live, it lacked direction and was on the
verge of an ideological collapse. In time, however, it managed
to muster two more congresses. With the advent of Krste Misirkov's
book, a new tide of opinion was spreading throughout Macedonia.
Misirkov warned against falling under the influence of the
chauvinistic elements and recommended taking a more nationalistic
approach in order to weed out Vrhovist and conservative elements.
At the Prilep Congress held in May 1904, IMRO was re-vitalized
and its independence reasserted. The most significant developments
to emerge from this Congress were IMRO's ability to shed itself
of its conservative elements and to adopt a resolution to decentralize
the organization and give more power to the sub-districts.
This Congress literally split IMRO into two ideologically polarized
halves. While leftist IMRO adopted a defensive strategy, the
right wing conservative Vrhovists pursued a policy of renewed
confrontation. The two factions continued to masquerade under
the same banner and were headed for a showdown. The showdown
materialized in November of 1905, at the Rila Monastery near
the Macedonian-Bulgarian border and took the form of a General
Congress. There was a single item of paramount importance on
the agenda, to determine the direction of the Organization.
Defeated at the Rila Congress, the Right wing Vrhovists took
up permanent residence in Sofia and continued to wage a terrorist
war on the IMRO leadership. Both Nikola Karev, in 1905, and
Dame Gruev, in 1906, were indirectly eliminated by terrorist
acts of the Vrhovists.
Bulgarian interference in Macedonia not only damaged the revolutionary
movement but also put fear in the civilian population, ripening
conditions for Balkan intervention. Greece and later Serbia
were quick to take advantage of a weak IMRO and a frightened
population. With the assistance of the Turkish military they
were able to step up armed propaganda campaigns inside Macedonia.
The aim was to kill two birds with one stone. By being the
eyes and ears of the Turks, the Greek clergy spied on the Macedonians
and disclosed information to Turkish authorities. The Turkish
military in turn, stepped up activities to eradicate the remnants
of the Cheti and their leaders. At the same time, in the midst
of terror, the same Greek spies who were spying on them were
also offering Macedonians Hellenism as a way to salvation. "No
one can deny that the Greeks owed much to the Turks. Indeed
the victory of the Turks in 1903 was the salvation of Hellenism
in Macedonia. From the outset the Greek clergy and notables
devised means of passing information to the Turks. The Turkish
authorities on their side welcomed this support." (Pages
118-119, Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913)
The most notorious of the Greek clergy was the Metropolitan
of Kostur, Archbishop Germanos Karavangelis. Karavangelis was
sent to Macedonia by the Patriarch Constantine V who favoured
the Athenian (the most nationalist) style of Hellenism and
selected Karavangelis as the right man to do the job. Dakin
portrays Karavangelis as a charismatic and capable figure of
a man that is a credit to the human race. (Pages 119-127, The
Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913) That, however, is far
from the truth. Karavangelis was a ruthless killer and a disgrace
to the Christian religion. Karavangelis was personally responsible
for the assassination of hundreds of Macedonian patriots including
priests, notables, teachers and IMRO leaders. He was also personally
responsible for Hellenizing hundreds of Macedonian villages,
by force and by sheer terror. If you wish to know more about
Karavangelis' terrorist actions in Macedonia read his biography
(the original version) "Arheio Makedonikou Agona, Pinelopis
Delta, Apomnimoneymata, Germanou Karavaggeli, Georgiou Dikonymou
Makri, Panagioti Papatzanetea".
Karavangelis' first priority after accepting the post as Metropolitan
of Kostur was to raise an army. He couldn't import one, the
Great Powers were watching, so he resorted to purchasing one.
The most pliable and feeble-minded man who would sell his soul
for gold was the self styled brigand Kote of Rula ("the
darling of Athens"). Kote sold out his own people for
Greek gold. From being the most revered Cheta leader, Kote
became the most hated man in Macedonia. When Karavangelis decided
who was to die, Kote became the executioner. In addition to
regular pay for murder, Kote and his band of no-goods received
additional rewards of gold coins for turning in desired body
parts from their victims. While Kote was doing the murdering
in the Macedonian villages, Karavangelis, in person with Turkish
escorts, was Hellenizing. Nothing and no one could stand in
his way. Those who Karavangelis couldn't buy or bribe he had
killed. "By containing and fragmenting the Internal Organization
in Western Macedonia, Kota (Kote) and Karavangelis not only
caused the projected rising to be continually postponed but
they also caused it to be undertaken prematurely; and eventually
they both contributed towards its defeat and failure. True,
most of the recorded action (the arrests, searches and attacks
on villages and bands) were carried out by the Turks, but the
Turks nearly always acted on information supplied by Karavangelis
or his agents. It was Karavangelis again who prevailed upon
the Turks to attack Smardeshi (Smurdersh) on 9/22 May 1903." (Page
132, Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913)
"After the Ilinden rising of August 1903, it was Karavangelis
who, escorted by 600 Turkish soldiers, visited the villages,
celebrating mass, speaking to the villagers and calling upon
them to surrender arms. The result was that even such strongholds
as Aposkepos (Aposkep), Zagoritsani (Zagoricheni) and Gabresi
(Gabresh), which only a few months before had declared themselves
Exarchist, now returned to the Patriarchist fold. Without the
support of the Turks, it is doubtful whether Karavangelis's
work would have been successful. It is equally doubtful, however,
whether but for the activities of the Patriarchist counter-movement,
the Turkish authorities could have dealt such a decisive blow
to the Internal Organization (IMRO)." (Page 135, Dakin,
The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913)
The ultimate disgrace for Karavangelis came after the massacre
of the village Zagoricheni. Refusing to bend to Hellenism,
Zagoricheni, on direct orders from Karavangelis, was massacred
to the last person the Greeks could lay their hands on, including
the unborn children inside the wombs of pregnant women. Witnesses
reported finding bodies of pregnant women with their abdomens
cut open. The survivors who escaped the atrocity refused to
bury the dead bodies of their neighbours. For days the dead
were guarded until the European consuls in Bitola came to witness
the atrocities for themselves. Here is what Brailsford had
to say. "The chef d'oevre of this Hellenic campaign was
achieved at Zagoricheni, a large Bulgarian village (author's
note: Macedonian village, there were no Bulgarian villages
inside Macedonia) near Klissoura, which, like Mokreni, took
a leading part in the uprising of 1903, and like Mokreni was
burned by the Turks. A Greek band, which is said to have numbered
over two hundred men under three Greek officers in uniform,
surprised it by night (April 6-7, 1905) by using bugle calls
which led the villagers to suppose that Turkish regulars were
manoeuvering in the neighbourhood. They burned ten houses,
and twenty-eight of the temporary homes erected amid the ruins
of the last conflagration. They wounded seven persons and killed
no less than sixty, among them seven women, twenty-two persons
over sixty years of age, and five children under fifteen. There
was a good deal of evidence to show that the local Turkish
authorities were privy to this massacre, and some circumstances
seemed to include the Archbishop of Castoria (Kostur). It is
quite clear that no conflict or provocation preceded what was
simply a deliberate massacre, and the only reason for choosing
Zagoricheni was that it was an eager and patriotic Bulgarian
center, and that it disobeyed the summons of the Greek Archbishop
to return to the Patriarch fold." (Pages 216-217, Macedonia
its Races and their Future) After the massacre when it was
discovered that Karavangelis was implicated, to escape punishment,
the cowardly Archbishop of Kostur fled to Sveta Gora (Holy
Mountain) where he spent two years in hiding before fleeing
to Austria. Today, there is a statue of Karavangelis in Kostur
to commemorate his great contributions to Hellenism.
Macedonians were well acquainted with the murderous activities
of the Bulgarian Vrhovists whose new waves of terrorist bands
began to penetrate the eastern borders of Macedonia in March
of 1904. Fortunately, Yane Sandanski's forces were still in
control of the Pirin district and more often than not, successfully
repealed Bulgarian advances. In the west bands of young Turks,
who deserted the army during the Ilinden rebellion, joined
Albanian gangs, looting and killing indiscriminately. From
the north Serbian bands began to penetrate Macedonian territory.
By mid 1905, there were eleven bands numbering almost 100 men
pillaging, murdering, razing entire villages and wreaking their
own special brand of terror. The most violent campaign was
waged by the Greek terrorists who penetrated the south-central
regions of Macedonia. By 1905 the Greeks imported a contingent
of Cretans, a thousand-strong, and reinforced it with Turkish
deserters who roamed unhindered razing and slaughtering entire
villages. By 1906 eight bands numbering over 400 men were operating
in the Solun district alone and another twelve bands of 600
men around Bitola.
Along with the intrusions of armed bands in Macedonia there
reappeared the foreign schools and propaganda institutions
directed by the Greek and Bulgarian churches. The terrorist
bands instilled fear in the Macedonian population and the churches
were quick to take on the role of protector, setting the stage
for the partitioning of Macedonia.
It was well known that there were no Greek, Bulgarian, or
Serbian ethnicities living in Macedonia but that didn't stop
the new Balkan States from inventing them. The wheels of the
protagonists were turning when they attempted to kill two birds
with one stone by cleverly substituting "ethnicity" for "church
affiliation". By the end of the 19th century the Christian
Millet of Ottoman Macedonia was already divided into two millets
(the Greek Patriarchist Millet and the Bulgarian Exarchist
Millet). First, since there was no Macedonian Millet there
was no "governing body" to represent a Macedonian
religious denomination. Second, since all Christians in Macedonia
already belonged to one millet or another, it was easy to make "ethnic" claims
on behalf of "church affiliation". In modern terms,
all Macedonians belonging to the Patriarchist fold were considered
to be ethnic Greek. Similarly, all those Macedonians belonging
to the Exarchist fold were considered to be ethnic Bulgarians.
By introducing Serbian churches and schools, Serbia later used
similar tactics to claim the existence of a Serbian ethnicity
inside Macedonia.
All Macedonians belonging to the Patriarchist church were
given Greek or "Hellenized" names. Similarly, all
Macedonians belonging to the Exarchist church were given Bulgarian
names. In many instances brothers, born of the same parents,
were given different last names because they happened to go
to different churches. Their choice of church had nothing to
do with loyalty to one faction or the other, but rather with
the church's location relative to their homes. Each brother
attended the church nearest to his house as he had always done.
The sad part was that now with every spoonful of religion came
a dose of venomous propaganda. Brother was pitted against brother,
one fighting for "Hellenism" and the other for "Bulgarism".
At the beginning of the Ilinden rebellion most Macedonian villages
belonged to the Exarchate Church. With increased Greek activities
through Karavangelis and others like him, the tide was turning.
The Greek success was mainly due to the Turkish-Greek alliance
and the Turkish militia's assistance. The Macedonian people
were frightened to a point of agreeing to anything to escape
further punishment.
The alliance, which gave the Greeks the upper hand, did not
go unnoticed by the Bulgarians. British fears of a Turkish-Bulgarian
war were alleviated when Bulgaria on April 8th, 1904 signed
a peace agreement with Turkey. Bulgaria promised to reduce
subversive actions in Macedonia in exchange for Turkish promises
to implement the Murzsteg Reform Program and to extend it to
the Endrene (Dardanelles) region. Russia was not too happy
about the agreement, especially since Bulgaria herself was
beginning to make moves towards Endrene. Being of strategic
importance, Russia was hoping to eventually annex Endrene for
itself.
The prospect of declining Bulgarian intrusions inside Macedonia
was welcome news for Karavangelis. The Greeks could now import
fighters from Crete, to fight the Macedonian Cheti, side by
side with their Turkish allies without Bulgarian interference.
Unfortunately, while the Bulgarians reduced their military
intrusions, they stepped up Exarchist activities creating stiff
competition for the Greeks. The clergy on both sides were going
after the same flock as both sides appointed themselves protectors
and guardians of the people. In the eyes of the world they
became ambassadors of the Christian flock in Macedonia. This
competition to attract parishioners created friction between
the opposing factions. Friction turned to violence in villages
where both groups existed and fought for control over the village
church. The Turks were indifferent to the squabbling due to
its religious nature and remained neutral in church disputes.
When fights erupted, the Turks padlocked the church so neither
group could use it. As competition for control of the village
churches intensified so did brigand warfare. Local squabbling
never went unnoticed and both Patriarchists and Exarchists
sent their hatchet men to eliminate the so-called "troublemakers".
Many priests, teachers, notables and community leaders lost
their lives in this way.
To be continued...
References:
Stefou, Chris. History of the Macedonian People from Ancient
times to the Present. Toronto: Risto Stefov Publications, 2005
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You can contact the author at rstefov@hotmail.com

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